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Scott: Scott: Is Innocence Forever Gone

IS INNOCENCE FOREVER GONE?
DRUG TESTING HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETES
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.'
Schools have changed. The alarming increase in illegal drug use in
schools has forced our nation's educators to pursue policies that were
virtually unheard of a few short years ago. 2 School systems today are
turning not only toward extensive educational programs but also to drugtesting as a means to combat the influx of drugs into the school environment.3
Students and schools are battling in the courtroom concerning drugrelated programs and are raising questions about students' constitutional
rights. 4 One of the more prevalent assertions is that schools are subjecting
students to unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the fourth

1. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
2. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, WHAT WORKS: SCHOOLS WITHouT

5 (1987) ("Fifty-eight percent of high school seniors have used drugs.").
Nonmetropolitan areas reported 41% illicit drug use by high school seniors during
1985-1986 as compared to 48% for high school seniors in metropolitan areas.
Thirteen percent of high school seniors have used cocaine in the past year, more
than double the proportion in 1975. Id.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVDRUGS

ICES,

REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE NATURE AND EFFECT-

IVENESS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LocAL DRUG PREVENTION/EDCATION PROGRAMS

70 (Oct. 1987). "Based on a random, stratified sample of 700 school districts,

respondents indicate that nearly three-fourths of the districts have a written policy

on substance abuse and three-fifths require substance abuse education for at least
some grade levels. . . . Only 4% of school districts report having drug-testing
programs." Id. at Part I, § 1, at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
4. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc) (canine sniff); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F.
Supp. 833 (1988) (drug testing); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark.
1985), modified, 663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (drug testing); Jones v. Latexo
Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (canine sniff of entire
student body including kindergartners); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (canine sniff that resulted in nude search); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d

869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (search of student's coat); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-E.
Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (App. Ch.
Div. 1985) (canine sniff).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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amendment. While the United States Supreme Court has ruled on some
basic issues dealing with the constitutional rights of schoolchildren, including
the fourth amendment, 5 the court has not directly treated the issue of drug
testing in elementary, middle, or high schools. 6
This Note focuses on random urinalysis testing of high school athletes
and how the courts are responding to the constitutional implications involved. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.7 an Indiana district
court denied the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by two student
athletes to prevent the implementation of a random drug testing program.
The plaintiffs alleged the proposed program would violate their constitutionally protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.9
The court's holding was based on the recent decision in New Jersey
v. T.L.O.10 which relied on the two-prong test from Terry v. Ohio" as
the standard to be used in analyzing searches in public high schools. In
Terry, the Court emphasized the need to balance the respective needs and
rights of the parties involved.12 Balancing requires a determination that the
search was justified and that it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified it. ' 3 While the Schaill court premised its
decision on balancing the needs and interests of the parties, it also took

5.

Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,

-

U.S.

-

, 108 S. Ct. 562

(1988) (restricted first amendment rights of students in public schools); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (established reasonable suspicion search standards
consonant with fourth amendment and unique setting of public schools); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment
applies to schoolchildren); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (fourteenth amendment applies in school environment).

6. "The United States Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials" as provided in the

fourth amendment. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 850. In order for fourth amendment
protection to apply, state action must be implicated in the disputed activity. For
purposes of this Note "school(s)" refers to public institutions whose function has
"traditionally been performed as the 'exclusive' prerogative of the state." Rendell-

Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). Actions by private institutions, although
performing a public function, do not constitute state action unless they are done
in concert with a state actor. Id. at 835 n.6.
7. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988).

8. Id. at 858.
9. Id. at 848. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of their right to privacy,

and due process and equal protection as embodied in the fourteenth amendment.
This Note concentrates only on the allegations of fourth amendment violations.
The court also questioned the plaintiffs' standing to seek the requested relief as

the proposed program is just that, a proposal, and "conceivably, for a variety of
reasons, they [plaintiffs] may never be the subject of urinalysis testing for drugs."
Id. at 850-51.
10. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

11. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. Id. at 21.
13.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7
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advantage of a "crack in the door" left open in T.L.O. when the Court
declined to address whether individualized suspicion is required to justify
searches in a school setting. 14 This is a critical component in analyzing the
justification prong from the Terry test because, historically, the Supreme

Court has upheld searches without individualized suspicion in only a limited
number of situations. Usually, this has been where a diminished expectation
of privacy and minimal intrusion is balanced against weighty governmental
interests."i Despite the grave dangers of drug use by athletes, it is questionable whether the lack of individualized suspicion can be justified when
one considers the intrusive nature of urinalysis testing.
FACTS

In the fall of 1987, Harrison High School formulated a drug testing
program and scheduled it to begin in October. 6 Darcy Schaill and Shelly
Johnson filed suit in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent the proposed drug testing program from being implemented at
Harrison High School. 17 They attacked the program contending it 1) violated
their fourth amendment rights by requiring them to submit to unreasonable
searches and seizures; 2) interfered with their legitimate expectations of

privacy; 3) violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;
4) violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; 5)
violated their basic constitutional rights in that it predicated participation
in interscholastic sports upon the waiver of those rights.
The Proposed Drug Testing Program

The preliminary formalities of the program required that prior to
participation in any interscholastic sports each student athlete submit a
consent form signed and dated by the student and his or her custodial

parent or guardian.' 9 It also required each student to attend educational

14. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 852.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983);
United States v. Martinez-Fuentes, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Camarav. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
16. Id. at 836.
17. Id. at 835.
18. Id. at 848.
19. Id. at 836. The consent form reads as follows:
I have received and have read and understand a copy of the "TSC Drug
Education and Testing Program". I desire that
-participate
in this
program and in the interscholastic athletic program of
School and
hereby voluntarily agree to be subject to its terms. I accept the method
of obtaining urine samples, testing and analyses of such specimens, and
all other aspects of the program. I agree to cooperate in furnishing urine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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sessions regarding the drug testing program and receive copies and expla20
nations of the program.
TSC's proposed program applied to any student participating in interscholastic sports, including cheerleaders, each of whom was designated
as a "student athlete. ' ' 2' The rationale for singling out athletic participants

was based on a belief that student athletes are prominent members of the
student body and "accordingly are expected to be 'good examples of
conduct, sportsmanship and training, which includes avoiding drug and
alcohol usage."' Furthermore, TSC indicated there is an element of danger
to self and others when athletic participants use drugs. 23 TSC described its
program purposes as being "educational, diagnostic, and preventative, as
opposed to punitive or disciplinary." '
Logistics

The athletic director and the head coach of each team were authorized
to initiate and select an unlimited number of student athletes to test. There
was no limit established on the number of selections. One list, kept by
the athletic director, would cross-reference the student athlete to an assigned
selection number. At the time of selection, numbers would be drawn
randomly from a box.25 Each athlete selected would be required to "provide
a sample of his or her urine in a verifiable manner, but the collection of
the sample [would] not be physically observed." ' 26 A label with the student
athlete's number and the date would be attached to the sample. To verify
accuracy, the student and the athletic director were to then initial the

cross-reference list. Only the head coach, the athletic director, and the
specimens that may be required from time to time.
I further agree and consent to the disclosure of the sampling, testing
and results as provided for in this program. This consent is given pursuant

to all State and Federal Privacy Statutes and is a waiver of rights to nondisclosure of such test records and results only to the extent of the
disclosures authorized in the program.
Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 837 (quoting TSC Drug Education and Testing Program).
Id.
Id. at 836. The purposes of the program are stated as follows:

to prevent drug and alcohol usage, to educate student athletes as to the
serious physical, mental and emotional harm caused by drug and alcohol
abuse, to alert student athletes with possible drug problems to the potential
harms, to prevent injury, illness and harm as a result of drug and alcohol
abuse, and to maintain at TSC high schools an athletic environment free
of alcohol and drug abuse.
Id. at 837.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting TSC Proposed Drug Testing Program).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7
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staff person to whom the sample was given would know who was selected. 27
"A competent laboratory" would test the sample for "alcohol, street drugs
. .. and performance enhancing drugs (such as steroids)." The lab would
report the results to the student, his or her parent or guardian, the athletic
director, and the head coach. 29
The toxicologist selected to do the testing was to first screen for
marijuana using immunoassay technique (EMIT) followed by thin layer
chromatography (TLC).30 If the results from these tests were positive, gas
chromatography mass spectrography (GCMS) would be utilized to confirm
the results. To screen for amphetamines and opiates the preliminary test
would be TLC followed by GCMS to confirm positive results. Cocaine
would require three tests for confirmation. No tests were to be conducted
for birth control pills or pregnancy.
Each student athlete would be given a chance to explain positive test
results or to provide for additional testing." If the student could not
32
provide a satisfactory explanation, the school would suggest counseling.
Student athletes showing positive results with no acceptable explanation
could be tested at anytime while participating in interscholastic sports.
Reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use by a student athlete would
33
also give TSC the right to test at any time.
Enforcement

If test results were positive, the school would exercise no discipline,
in that the student would not be expelled or suspended. 34 The first positive
test involving alcohol would result in a 20% suspension from athletic

contests of the relevant sport. 35 The first positive test for drugs other than

alcohol would result in a 30% suspension 6 Second occurrences would
result in a 50% suspension from current participation with a potential
carry-over to the next sport. 37 Third and fourth occurrences would result
in a full calender year suspension and an interscholastic career suspension,

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
least two

Id.
Id. (quoting TSC Proposed Drug Testing Program).
Id.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 837. Test results "are considered positive only if, after using at
types of analyses, it indicates that drug residue substances are present

in the system." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. It was unclear from the facts in the case what a "20% suspension"
exactly meant. It appears to mean 20% of the scheduled events in one season. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 837-38.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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respectively. 8 First or second suspensions could be reduced by participation
in counseling approved by the athletic director.3 9 Suspensions were to be
from varsity contests and would be applied to practices at the coach's
discretion. 40

FouRTH

AMENDMENT

Legal Standard
The fourth amendment protects personal privacy, dignity, and security
from unreasonable searches or intrusions by the state. 4 ' Historically, many
courts have upheld searches at public schools based upon a characterization
42
that school officials were acting in loco parentisrather than as state actors.
4
The Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.
rejected the notion that

38. Id. at 838.
39. Id. (the amount of reduction is 1% per hour of counseling).
40. Id.
41. The constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person's, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (canine
sniff of entire student population of junior and senior high school not a search
because school officials were acting in loco parentis); see also 4 W. LAFAVB, SEARCH

AN SmimuE § 10.11(a), at 164 (2d ed. 1987) (in loco parentis should be dropped
from the legal vocabulary as it has "become a substitute for analysis" and, similar
to parens patriae, is a "Latin phrase [which has] proved to be of great help to
those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the consitutional
scheme.") (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
43. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., a 14 year old school girl was found
by a teacher smoking cigarettes in the lavatory in violation of a school rule. She
was taken to the principal's office were she met the Assistant Vice Principal, Mr.
Choplick. After denying she was smoking, Mr. Choplick opened T.L.O.'s purse
and found cigarettes. He pulled the cigarettes out of the purse, and discovered
cigarette rolling papers. Upon a thorough search of T.L.O.'s purse Mr. Choplick
uncovered "a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags,
a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared
to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing." Id. at 328. The evidence was turned over to the
police and delinquency charges were brought against T.L.O. Contending that the
search violated the fourth amendment, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence
citing the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court held the search valid based upon
"reasonable suspicion", id. at 329, and by balancing the need of the school to
maintain a disciplined environment conducive to learning against TL.O.'s need for
privacy. Id. at 341.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7
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school officials act as parental surrogates to the students and for the first
time applied the principles of the fourth amendment to the rights of children
in the school setting. 4 In T.L.O., the Court noted the tension between
"contemporary reality" and the doctrine of in loco parentis stating "[ifn
carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to ["publicly
mandated educational and disciplinary ' ' 4 5] policies, school officials act as
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and
they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictfures of the Fourth
Amendment." 46 The Court's position was based upon the fact that the
authority instilled in school officials today is from statutorily mandated
"educational and disciplinary policies" rather than from voluntary relinquishment by the parents. 47 Thus, the Court established that school officials'
4 8
activities constituted state action for purposes of the fourth amendment.
Having determined that the fourth amendment is implicated in the
public school environment, the threshold question is whether the act at
issue (here, urine testing) is in fact a "search. ' 49 If an activity intrudes
upon an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy," the activity is
considered a "search" and fourth amendment protections apply.50 The
Supreme Court has held that there is no legitimate "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in "what a person knowingly exposes to the public."' 5' To

44. Id. at 336-37.
45.
46.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
Id. at 336-37.

47. Id. at 336.
48. The Court previously addressed schools and state action in Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982).
49. "Search" refers to the definition ascribed in the fourth amendment; 1
W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a) (2d ed. 1987). Under the traditional

approach, the term "search" is said to imply:

some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for
or seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by

force, and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either
actual or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed and that the object searched for has

been hidden or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said
that ordinarily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that
the mere looking at that which is open to view is not a "search".
Id. at 301-02 (quoting 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)) (footnotes
omitted). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MR4N.
L. REv. 349, 393 (1974) ("The question of what constitutes a covered "search"
or "seizure" would and should be viewed with an appreciation that to exclude
any particular police activity from coverage is essentially to exclude it from judicial
control and from the command of reasonableness, whereas to include it is to do
no more than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner.") (footnotes
omitted).
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Id.at 351.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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that effect, courts generally have held that taking samples of the voice,52
handwriting,5 3 or fingerprints54 are not searches whereas the taking of
blood, 55 stomach contents,5 6 and X-rays5 7 are searches which require compliance with the protective measures of the fourth amendment. With urinalysis testing, courts have generally concluded that because of societal
attitudes and practices regarding the discharge of urine, there is a legitimate
and reasonable expectation of privacy that brings urinalyses within the
meaning of fourth amendment searches and seizures.58 Discounting any
difference between a blood test, which intrudes into a person's body, and
the collection of discarded body fluids, one court emphasized the "basic
offense to human dignity" as reason enough to set urinalyses apart from
other more traditional types of searches. 9 A few courts have reached the
6
conclusion that urinalysis testing is a search with little or no discussion, 0
6t
while others have done so because the parties agreed upon the issue.
Searches are unconstitutional if they are deemed unreasonable. 62 Generally, reasonableness under the fourth amendment requires that a warrant
be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 63 Further, a warrant should
be issued only upon probable cause to believe an offense has been com-

52. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
54. Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 342, 645 S.W.2d 690 (1983).
55. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
56. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
57. United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
58. In McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) The court
stated:
[U]rine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances where the person
certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. One does
not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it
available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal
physiological secrets it holds .... One clearly has a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal information contained
in his body fluids.
Id. at 1127. See also Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J.
1986) (facilities designed to accommodate traditional privacy); cf. Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (the court felt compelled to say
urinalysis tests are a search despite doubt that the framers of the constitution
intended such coverage).
59. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); cf. Turner
v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. App. 1985) (Nebeker,
J., concurring) (as to seizures, collecting urine samples is not unlike collecting voice
and handwriting exemplar; there is no seizure of the person).
60. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Syscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 126667 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
61. Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wis. 1985); see also Storms
v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
62. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7
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mitted. 64 Courts have held that searches without a warrant are "per se"
unreasonable and therefore unlawful.6 The basic purpose behind the warrant
requirement is to insert a neutral party between the enforcing official and
the individual whose rights are being infringed. 66 The importance of the
warrant is so embedded in fourth amendment jurisprudence that the Supreme
Court has allowed only "a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions." 67 In T.L.O., the Court analogized searches in a school setting
to those in an administrative setting and those requiring "reasonable suspicion. ' 68 Under this analysis the T.L.O. Court upheld as "reasonable"
69
the warrantless search of a school girl's purse.
Dismissing the warrant requirement, the Court held that the requisite
level of suspicion to justify a warrantless search need not rise to that of
probable cause.70 Borrowing from Camara v. Municipal Court,71 the T.L.O.
Court emphasized that "the determination of the standard of reasonableness
governing any specific class of searches 'requires balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.' ' 72 The real question,

64.

Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within their

[public officials'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-

mation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that 'an offense has been or is being committed."' Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949) (quoting Carroll V. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925)).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
66. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (There are "two
distinct constitutional protections" being served by the warrant: one is to prohibit
any searches without probable cause because "any intrusion in the way of search
or seizure is an evil ...no intrusion is justified without a careful prior determination
of necessity;" and the second is that any search "deemed necessary should be as
limited as possible." The evil feared here is "a general, exploratory rummaging
in a person's belongings.").
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The recognized exceptions are:
1) Exigency: Searches with probable cause but under circumstances that
the time taken to get a warrant would frustrate the purposes of the search.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2) Consent: Searches conducted pursuant to the valid consent of the person
being searched. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
3) Arrest: Searches incident to arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
4) Reasonable Suspicion: Searches based upon reasonable suspicion that
the officer or the public is in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5) Administrative/Regulatory: Searches of a unique setting which justifies
relaxing the fourth amendment requirements. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
69. Id. at 347-48.
70. Id. at 340-41.
71. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
72. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 (1985) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37
(1967)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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then, in T.L.O. was how to strike the balance between the schoolchild's
legitimate privacy expectation and the need to maintain order, discipline,
and flexibility so as to provide an environment for learning in schools
where drugs and violence are rife.73 Rejecting the idea that society does
not recognize a student's right to privacy, the Court noted that although
discipline and order are difficult to maintain in public schools today, the
situation is not so dire that schools need be equated with prisons where
"no legitimate expectations of privacy" are recognized. 74
Instead, a two-fold inquiry was adopted based upon the test set forth

in Terry v. Ohio.75 "[Flirst, one must consider 'whether the ... action

was justified at its inception;' and [second], 'one must determine whether
the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope76to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other
school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such
a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively

intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."

ANALYSis
In Schaill, the district court held that the mandatory urinalysis drug
testing which TSC proposed did indeed constitute a search deserving of
fourth amendment protection.7 8 The court further held that the program
as proposed79 did not violate the constitutional protections prescribed by

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 338.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20

(1968)).
77. Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted).
78. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 850 (N.D.
Ind. 1988).
79. The Schaill court emphasized the very limited scope of its opinion: "The
focus here is on a paper proposal not yet executed and not an operational enterprise

....[T]his court addresses whether the defendants' program violates, on its face,
any legally protected rights or interests of these plaintiffs as student athletes, since
absent this role they would not be confronted with the possibility of the intended
search." Id. at 851.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7
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the fourth amendment. 0 In doing so, the court relied on the balancing
factors cited in New Jersey v. T.L.O.." Quoting T.L.O., the court stated
that because of the unique school setting the "legality of a search of a
student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." 8 2 While it referred to the two-fold test adopted
in T.L.O. to determine reasonableness, the Schaill court substituted its own
first prong, noting that in T.L.O. "the Supreme Court expressly left open"
the requirement of individualized suspicion. 3
Balancing Needs

Justification at the Inception
The T.L.O. Court's first prong required the search to be "justified at
its inception," which the Court said often included some reason for individualized suspicion. The Court held "under ordinary circumstances, a
search of students by public school authorities must be grounded on
reasonable suspicion" that the search will turn up evidence that the student
84
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.
The Schaill court outlined the question in the first prong of "justification
at the inception" as whether the circumstances peculiar to the Schaill case
would justify urinalysis "unsupported by individualized suspicion." 85 The

80. Id. at 855-57; the court also held that: 1) there were no violations of
due process in that the proposed program provided for a hearing, an opportunity
to seek additional testing, and the worst penalty imposed was permanent expulsion
from the voluntary interscholastic sports program and only after repeated offenses;
2) the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was not violated because
the program is applicable to all students, male and female, the decision to participate
in sports is totally voluntary, and the school is justified in singling out athletes
for testing due to the unique health and safety risks involved for student athletes
who are also drug users; and 3) the consent form does not operate as a waiver
of constitutional rights but only as authority for school officials to use the test
results in "the limited manner described in the program." Id. at 856-58.
81. 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985).
82. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 851 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341 (1985)).
83. Id. at 852. The court in T.L.O. stated:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element
of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities.
In other contexts, however, we have held that although "some quantum
of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion."
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (footnotes omitted).
84. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 851-52.
85. Id. at 852.
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court never really said that urinalysis without individualized suspicion was
justified in the case at hand. Such a finding is the obvious implication,
however, since the court upheld the proposed drug testing program. This
tact is somewhat surprising in light of past judicial decisions in which
unique settings justified the use of the reasonableness standard without
required
individualized suspicion. Typically, in such situations courts have
86
both a strong state interest and a low degree of intrusiveness.
Camarav. Municipal Court, which introduced the administrative search,
was partially based on the fact that the searches involved were not "personal
in nature." 87 There, the Court found that administrative searches were
necessary as the only effective means of enforcing housing codes. Further,
the Court felt the difficulty in detecting safety hazards, the strong interest
in public safety and welfare in housing inspections, and the fact that the
searches were of homes and not people, justified the lack of reasonable
suspicion.88 In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 9 the Supreme Court
held that, in border searches, brief detainment of offshore boats by customs
officials was permissible without reasonable suspicion. 90 Given the government's interest in deterring and apprehending smugglers, a brief detention
enabling officials to "visit public areas of the vessel, .

.

. and inspect

documents" was justified where neither the vessel nor its occupants were
searched. 9' The Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte92 upheld
fixed border checkpoint stops for brief questioning where no reasonable
suspicion existed. 93 The Court cited the importance of controlling the influx
of illegal aliens and held that because of heavy traffic94 flow at the border
it was impractical to require individualized suspicion.
The Court in T.L.O. said that while it was not deciding the issue of
individualized suspicion as related to searches in schools, exceptions to that
requirement have been "appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where 'other safeguards' are available
'to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
"subject to the discretion of the official in the field."' 95 Administrative
searches and border searches represent relatively minimal intrusions into a
person's privacy because they usually are invasions into the "effects" of
the persons involved. Here, the search at issue entails an analysis of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
Id.
Id.
462 U.S. 579 (1983).
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 592.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. The court held that "check-point stops are seizures within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 556.
94. Id. at 556-57.
95.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) (citations omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/7

12

19891

Scott: Scott: Is Innocence Forever Gone

DR UG TESTING

discarded body fluids. While, arguably, this type of search is not as
repugnant as some other types, 96 the collection of the fluid sample itself
presents a real issue. Our culture has instilled into each of us the very
private nature of discharging urine and observance or listening can be
exceedingly embarrassing. While it is true that athletes as a general rule
find themselves sharing locker rooms and public facilities, it would be both
a giant leap and conclusory to state that their privacy expectations as to
urinalysis tests are therefore greatly diminished. Locker rooms and public
restrooms function in a context where one blends in with the activity rather
than being singled out. Conversely, a urinalysis test points to one person
individually and says "perform." As one court put it: "urinalyses are
degrading." 97
Courts have continuously distinguished searches of persons from searches
of places and effects. 98 Except for the basic discussion of whether a urinalysis
test is a constitutionally protected search, the court in Schaill barely addressed the student's need for privacy or the level of intrusion experienced
by a urinalysis test, despite claiming to recognize the need to balance both

sides of the issue.
The basic premise that seems to underlie the focus of TSC's drug-

testing program is that if statistics show an average of 20-30 percent of
our nation's athletes to be using drugs, then correspondingly, 20-30 percent
of athletes at Harrison High School must be using drugs. Drugs are injurious
to the user and others. Therefore, testing all students participating in
interscholastic sports is justified. 99 The Supreme Court has rejected this
notion of suspicion-by-association because it goes a long way towards
undermining the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards which
guard against "general, exploratory rummaging." 100 The Court in Ybarra
v. Illinois,10 1 ruled that even where the reasonable suspicion standard allows
searches on less than probable cause, the requirement of particularized
suspicion remains intact. 0 2

96. Presumably a court would draw the line at forced invasions into a

person's body short of probable cause. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757

(1966).

97. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (1985). See supra notes 5861 and accompanying text.
98. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)

("One's body simply cannot be equated with his car, his clothing, or even his
home as a repository of evidence."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
99. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 855 (N.D.
Ind. 1988).
100. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

101. 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (search of tavern customers based upon a warrant
to search the tavern and the bartender).
102. Id. at 91.
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The Terry v. Ohio03 exception adopted in T.L.O. requires reasonable
suspicion directed at the person to be searched.'01 Suspicion directed at
one individual cannot be transferred to another simply because they are
similarly situated. 0 Likewise, information about a particular class of individuals (athletes) cannot create reasonable suspicion of the guilt of each
member of the class.
The decision in Schaill defines no standard at all for determining whether
a search is justified. The court espouses the use of the two-prong test but
ignores any meaningful discussion of applying it in a situation lacking
individualized suspicion. For all practical purposes, it leaves the decision
of when and what to search totally in the hands of the school officials
and does not provide the "safeguards" called for in T.L.0.-.' 6 The danger
is not so much in the instant case as there is a specific program which
provides some safeguards against abuse, but rather, the danger lies in the
precedent the cases establish.
Reasonableness of Scope
The second prong set out in T.L.O. deals with the scope of the search.'17
It requires that "the measures adopted [be] reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'018
The primary objective of the TSC program is "drug-free student athletes."' 9 The Schaill court noted that participants were both male and
female, ranging in age from 14 to 18 years. The offense addressed is the
use of drugs, prohibited by school policies, state law, and athletic training
rules. Procedures established for collection and cross-checking ensure a
"true" sample and one that actually belongs to the particular student tested.
Further, the program is a written plan which includes notice prior to the
sports season and an opportunity to explain positive test results. No provision for academic punishment is included and the collection of the urine
samples "will not be visually observed."" 0

103. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
104. Id.

105. Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (strip searches of
prison visitors); United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (strip
search of an airline flight attendant based upon a tip concerning a fellow crewmember).
106. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).

107. Id. at 341.
108. Id. at 342.
109.

Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 852 (N.D.

Ind. 1988).
110. Id.
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It is true that drug usage in schools is a grave social problem across
the nation. It is questionable, however, whether random urinalysis testing
can be justified in this case. There is no evidence in the case to indicate
that Harrison High School has a drug problem with its student athletes.
In fact, the testimony in the case as to drug usage was based on studies
of national averages and was not directed toward a particular problem in
TSC schools."' Several of the witnesses indicated they had not observed
drug usage at Harrison High School and were unaware of a drug problem.
Combined with the apparent lack of a drug problem among the student
athletes is the intrusive nature of this particular kind of search. There was
testimony in the case that mandatory urinalysis testing can create so much
stress that some individuals are unable to void the bladder for up to two
or three hours." 2 Subjecting adolescents to stress of this kind based on

random, generalized suspicion seems harsh at a minimum.
One might also take issue with the fact that the evidence related to
the testing procedures which TSC employed, in the court's words, "indicates
that little, if anything, can be inferred relative to current impairment from
the proposed program.""' This basically means that the tests do not show
whether a student is currently under the influence of drugs and, therefore,
is in danger of injury due to physical impairment or is violating the school's
anti-drug rules. This finding is counterbalanced in the court's opinion by
the evidence related to potential injuries and health hazards to athletes due
to increased exertion, stress, and bodily contact. Admittedly, the evidence
supports the supposition that participation in sports while under the influence of drugs is dangerous not only to the student but also to the other
teammembers. It appears, however, that if the tests cannot show a student
to be currently under the influence of drugs they are ultimately being used
to show general drug usage; not to protect student athletes from sports
injuries. There is no evidence to support the supposition that it is more
dangerous to student athletes to use drugs outside the sports arena than
it is for any other student. Since there is no ability to determine current
impairment through a urinalysis test, it is arguable that any purpose other
than punishment is served by drug testing student athletes.
Further, the same arguments can be made for alcohol testing as for
drugs. Yet the evidence showed that the toxicologist indicated he would
not be testing for alcohol unless the school advised him to do so. This
implies there is no pre-established plan for alcohol testing. If the objective
of the program is to ensure drug-free athletes, one wonders why alcohol
is excluded. The facts indicate that the Superintendent of Schools at TSC
believes alcohol to be "the most frequently used drug" and further admits
that the proposed drug testing program would be an ineffective means for

111. Id. at 839-40.
112. Id. at 843.
113. Id. at 857.
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detecting alcohol." 4 It is difficult to justify an intrusive drug test of this
nature when it does not even address the "most frequently used drug."
Undoubtedly, the need to address the problem of drugs in schools is
an important one. The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the
fact that drugs are a "major social problem" in schools today., 5 Students
with drug habits not only harm themselves, but as well interfere with the
learning process by creating disorder and discipline problems. This is a
weighty problem in a setting where order is already difficult to maintain.
Additionally, as the Schaill court stated, athletes are viewed with admiration and respect and carry with them the power to influence others'
behavior." 6 The student athlete represents his or her school to the outside

community and accordingly has a responsibility to uphold the school's
image. By participating in athletics, students also voluntarily embrace a
lifestyle requiring rigorous preparation for sports events, scholastic requirements, and adherence to training rules." 7 It could be said that the
privilege to participate in sports carries with it an additional price in the
interest of all these considerations; that of submitting to drug testing.
Other considerations, however, must be part of the balancing process.
The Supreme Court in Camara, factored into its balancing formula the
fact that housing code inspections based on a general area was the only
alternative that would "achieve acceptable results.""' 8 In Schail, the court
declined to address other alternative methods by which TSC could reach
its desired goal stating that the other methods were not at issue; that the
only issue was whether the "Constitution of the United States prohibits
this school board from adopting and implementing this drug program."" 9
Given the intrusive nature of urinalysis testing, this court should have
considered the availability of alternative means of detection as a factor in
balancing "the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. ' 120 In Delaware v. Prouse,2 1 the Supreme Court espoused the need
to include this factor in the balancing test: "[g]iven the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might be adopted,
we are unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety
of the random spot check justifies the practice under the fourth amendment."i2
Finally, courts should not forget that the methods and practices employed in schools are lessons that students will remember in later life.

114.
115.

Id. at 841.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).

116. Schaill, 679 F.2d at 856.
117.
118.

Id.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).

119.

Schaill, 679 F.2d at 856.

120. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
121. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
122. Id. at 659.
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"That they [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles for our government as mere platitudes." 1 23
CONCLUSION

Random urinalysis cannot be justified under the Terry standard as
interpreted by the Schaill court. It fails the first prong of Terry in that

unique settings which allow for a lesser standard of reasonable suspicion
require that where the search is of a personal and highly intrusive nature,
at a minimum, individualized suspicion is necessary. It fails the second
prong because when all the relevant factors are balanced, singling out all
athletes for the random test by virtue of their position in the school can

not be justified.
Even though the situation here is a school setting rather than a police
setting, it is useful to note that random urinalysis of student athletes is
in direct contravention of the basis of our criminal justice system; that all

persons are innocent until proven guilty. TSC's proposed program assumes
the opposite; that all athletes are guilty until proven innocent. The court
points to the opportunity to defend positive results at school or to appeal

through the judicial system./24 It affords little consolation, after the fact,
that a court is willing to say "it shouldn't have happened" to a schoolchild
5
subjected to the degrading experience of a urinalysis test.1

123. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
124. Schail, 679 F. Supp. at 857.
125. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D.
Ind. 1988) was affirmed on appeal. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). The court of
appeals agreed that urinalysis tests are searches within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The court concluded that individualized suspicion is not required for
searches of student athletes because 1) athletes have diminished expectations of
privacy; 2) the governmental interests furthered are weighty and no other alternative
method would suffice; and 3) the search was not intended to uncover criminal
activity. Schaill, 864 F.2d 1309.
For a discussion regarding athletes' privacy expectations, see supra notes 9597 and accompanying text. As to governmental interests, while the war on drugs
is admittedly a weighty problem, there is no evidence in this case to suggest it is
a weighty problem in this school. See supra note Ill and accompanying text. The

court also dismissed the argument that less intrusive alternative methods are available
without any meaningful discussion thus, accepting the district court's ruling that
the drug testing here is "reasonable." Schaill, 864 F.2d 1309. Arguably, when an
intrusive search such as urinalysis testing is involved, it should be required that
testing be the best alternative available. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying
text. Finally, it is agreed that uncovering criminal activity was not the basis for
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It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.'1'
MARY L. ScorT

setting up the drug testing program. However, since the tests cannot determine
current impairment it is questionable whether the purpose of preventing drug related
injuries is met. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Arguably, the test
becomes punitive in nature in that athletes will be suspended for activity taking
place outside the confines of school authority.
126. Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886)).
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